On the Relation Between SIM and IND-RoR Security Models for PAKEs by Lopez Becerra, José Miguel et al.
On the Relation Between SIM and IND-RoR Security Models for PAKEs
Jose´ Becerra, Vincenzo Iovino, Dimiter Ostrev, and Marjan Sˇkrobot
University of Luxembourg,
Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust,
6, avenue de la Fonte, L-4364, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
{jose.becerra, vincenzo.iovino, dimiter.ostrev, marjan.skrobot}@uni.lu
Keywords: Security Models, SIM-based Security, IND-based Security, Password Authenticated Key Exchange.
Abstract: Password-based Authenticated Key-Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow users, who need only to share a pass-
word, to compute a high-entropy shared session key despite passwords being taken from a dictionary. Security
models for PAKE protocols aim to capture the desired security properties that such protocols must satisfy
when executed in the presence of an active adversary. They are usually classified into i) indistinguishability-
based (IND-based) or ii) simulation-based (SIM-based). The relation between these two security notions is
unclear and mentioned as a gap in the literature. In this work, we prove that SIM-BMP security from Boyko et
al. (EUROCRYPT 2000) implies IND-RoR security from Abdalla et al. (PKC 2005) and that IND-RoR secu-
rity is equivalent to a slightly modified version of SIM-BMP security. We also investigate whether IND-RoR
security implies (unmodified) SIM-BMP security.
1 Introduction
The Password Authenticated Key Exchange
(PAKE) problem asks for two entities, who only share
a password, to engage in a conversation so that they
agree on a session key. The established session key
can be used to protect their subsequent communica-
tion. PAKE protocols play a key role in today’s world
as they allow for authenticated key exchange to occur
without the use of Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), by
using a human-memorable password instead. Theo-
retically, they are fascinating, because of their ability
to use a weak secret such as a password to produce
a strong cryptographic key in a provably secure way
over a hostile communications network.
The nature of passwords makes PAKE protocols
vulnerable to dictionary attacks. In such attacks, an
adversary tries to break the security of the protocol
by exhaustively enumerating all possible passwords
until a guess is correct. This strategy might not be
very successful on AKE schemes where the legitimate
entities share as long-term secret a high-entropy key.
However, in the PAKE setting the long term secrets
come from a small set of values, i.e. a dictionary,
posing a genuine security threat.
We distinguish between two types of possible dic-
tionary attacks: offline and online dictionary attacks.
In an offline dictionary attack, the adversary uses in-
teraction with the honest parties – or mere eavesdrop-
ping – to get information about the password that al-
lows him to launch an exhaustive offline search. In an
online dictionary attack, an attacker takes a password
from the set of possible passwords, interacts with a
legitimate party by running the protocol and checks
whether the key exchange succeeds for the candidate
password or not.
The cryptographic goal when designing PAKE
protocols is to ensure that the attacker essentially can-
not do better than an online dictionary attack. This
goal recognizes that while online dictionary attacks
cannot be avoided, offline dictionary attacks can and
should be prevented. Numerous PAKE protocols have
been designed trying to meet this goal but have later
been found to be flawed (Nam et al., 2013; Clarke and
Hao, 2014). Consequently, security models for PAKE
have been devised to get assurance on the claimed se-
curity properties by performing a rigorous analysis.
In this work, we consider the provable security ap-
proach, where protocols are analyzed in a complexity-
theoretic security model, the goal being that no rea-
sonable algorithm can violate security under various
hardness assumptions. The complexity-theoretic se-
curity models are classified into indistinguishability-
based (IND-based) and simulation-based (SIM-
based). In the IND-based approach security means
that no probabilistic polynomial-time (PTT) adver-
sary can distinguish an established session key sk
from a random string, i.e. it guarantees semantic se-
curity on sk. The SIM-based approach defines two
worlds: an ideal world which is secure by definition
and the real world which is the real protocol execution
against some PPT attacker. In the SIM-based setting,
security asks for the indistinguishability between the
ideal world and real world executions.
When dealing with formal security modeling of
PAKE, the difference between the two previously
mentioned approaches, IND and SIM, has practical
consequences. It is accepted that IND-based mod-
els are easier to work with for protocol designers
that wish to prove the security of their protocols.
In fact, currently, most of the security proofs for
PAKEs are constructed under the IND-based mod-
els Find-then-Guess (IND-FtG) from (Bellare et al.,
2000) and Real-or-Random (IND-RoR)1 from (Ab-
dalla et al., 2005). In contrast, constructing security
proofs in SIM-based models is considered more chal-
lenging. Two SIM-based models for PAKE that have
seen wider use are Boyko, MacKenzie and Patel’s
(BMP) model (Boyko et al., 2000) that is derived from
Shoup’s SIM-based model for AKE (Shoup, 1999)
and the Universal Composability (UC) framework of
Canetti et al. (Canetti et al., 2005) that follows UC
paradigm of Canetti (Canetti, 2001). While complex
for constructing proofs of security, it is fair to recog-
nize that SIM-based security i) offers a more intuitive
and natural approach to defining security, ii) it is sim-
pler to describe and interpret the security properties
captured by the model, iii) SIM-secure protocols are
well suited to accommodate secure composition re-
sults, and iv) it is possible to prove security of PAKE
protocols even in the case of correlated passwords that
may come from arbitrary password distributions.
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Figure 1: Known relations between PAKE security defini-
tions.
The known relations between PAKE security def-
initions are summarized in Figure 1. In particular, to
the best of the knowledge of the authors, no work
has been done to formally analyze the relation be-
tween the IND-RoR and SIM-BMP security notions
1IND-RoR is a refinement of IND-FtG model in which
the adversary has access to multiple test queries instead of
a single one.
for PAKE.2 As we can see in Figure 1, the only exist-
ing result that is known to hold between IND and SIM
based definitions is the one from (Canetti et al., 2005).
There, the authors show that their SIM-UC definition
implies the IND-FtG definition from (Bellare et al.,
2000).
In practical terms, the lack of comparison re-
sults between IND-based and SIM-based models for
PAKEs means that the security of PAKE protocols,
such as SPEKE,3 that have been studied in the SIM-
BMP simulation model of (Boyko et al., 2000) can
not be compared with other PAKE protocols that are
secure according to the SIM-UC or IND definitions.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this work our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• We first reconcile the syntactic differences be-
tween the IND-RoR and SIM-BMP models for
PAKE thus allowing honest comparison between
them. More specifically, we slightly modify the
initialization procedure of the IND-RoR model
(Abdalla et al., 2005) such that it follows the SIM-
BMP model.
• We prove that SIM-BMP security implies IND-
RoR security and that IND-RoR security is equiv-
alent to a slightly modified version of SIM-BMP
security adapted to the model of (Goldreich and
Lindell, 2001). We also investigate whether IND-
RoR security implies (unmodified) SIM-BMP se-
curity.
1.2 Related Work
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). The complex-
ity theoretic treatment of security for AKE protocols
was initiated by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 (Bel-
lare and Rogaway, 1993). In their groundbreaking
work, they followed the indistinguishability (IND)
2The result by Shoup (Shoup, 1999) on the equivalence
between IND-FTG model and SIM model for authenticated
key exchange with a high-entropy long-term secret does not
carry over to the PAKE setting. The reason for this is that
there is a non-negligible upper bound on the advantage of
the adversary in IND-based security definitions for PAKE.
This, in turn, does not admit loose reductions.
3The SPEKE protocol (Jablon, 1996) is one of the most
well-known PAKE designs. It has been proposed by Jablon
in 1996 and proven secure in the SIM-BMP model under the
Random Oracle (RO) assumption by MacKenzie (MacKen-
zie, 2001). SPEKE is practically relevant as it is specified
in the ISO/IEC 11770-4 (ISO/IEC 11770-4:2006, 2009) and
IEEE P1363.2 (IEEE P1363.2, 2002) standards.
approach to formalize the notion of security for Key
Exchange (KE) protocols, using previously estab-
lished symmetric keys as long-term secrets and con-
sidering the realistic scenario of concurrent sessions
running on a network under full control of the adver-
sary. In their model, an AKE protocol is secure if,
under the allowed adversary actions, the established
session key is computationally indistinguishable from
a random string. After this initial work, numerous
others have appeared studying the cryptographic se-
curity for KE protocols following the IND-based ap-
proach (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995; Blake-Wilson
and Menezes, 1997; Canetti and Krawczyk, 2001;
LaMacchia et al., 2007; Cremers, 2011; Brzuska
et al., 2011; Jager et al., 2012).
In parallel, the first simulation (SIM) definition for
KE was given by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk (Bel-
lare et al., 1998). In 1999, Shoup proposed another
security model for AKE protocols in the SIM-based
setting (Shoup, 1999) and informally compared his
model with the one from (Bellare et al., 1998). In the
same work, the author gave a sketch of a proof argu-
ing that SIM-security against both static and adaptive
adversaries is equivalent to the corresponding IND-
security notions of (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995).
Canetti and Krawczyk in (Canetti and Krawczyk,
2002) took SIM definitions further by expanding the
composition guarantees of KE from (Shoup, 1999) to
arbitrary protocols within the Universal Composabil-
ity (UC) framework of Canetti (Canetti, 2001).
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE).
The idea of PAKE has been first put forward by
Bellovin and Meritt in (Bellovin and Merritt, 1992).
Their proposal, the EKE protocol, was the first
to show that it is possible to design a password
authentication mechanism that can withstand of-
fline dictionary attacks. The SPEKE protocol from
Jablon (Jablon, 1996) soon appeared, following a very
different design strategy. However, both of these
works included only informal security justifications.
The first adequate security models for PAKE ap-
peared in (Bellare et al., 2000) and (Boyko et al.,
2000) around the same time. Both models were
built upon already existing AKE models. Although
the SIM-based model from (Boyko et al., 2000)
has been used to prove secure several PAKE proto-
cols (PAK (Boyko et al., 2000), RSA-based SNAPI
(MacKenzie et al., 2000), and SPEKE (MacKenzie,
2001)), it is the IND-FtG model from (Bellare et al.,
2000) that has established itself as the model of choice
when analyzing PAKEs. Using the IND-FtG model,
Katz et al. (Katz et al., 2001) managed to achieve
a breakthrough: they have shown how one can effi-
ciently realize PAKE without random oracles, but in-
stead relying on a common reference string (CRS). In
more theoretical work, Goldreich and Lindell (Gol-
dreich and Lindell, 2001) proposed a PAKE in the
plain model4 that follows the simulation tradition. A
few years later, Abdalla et al. (Abdalla et al., 2005)
showed that a stronger model than IND-FtG is neces-
sary when trying to achieve three-party PAKE. Hence,
they proposed a new model, known as the IND-RoR
model, which is proven to be stronger than the IND-
FtG model in the case of PAKE. The IND-RoR model
– enriched to handle forward secrecy – is consid-
ered the state-of-the-art model and has been used in
the analysis of most recent PAKE protocols (Abdalla
et al., 2015; Lancrenon et al., 2016). Another model
which is prominent in PAKE research is the Universal
Composability (UC) framework for PAKE of Canetti
et al. (Canetti et al., 2005). For more relevant papers
on PAKE, we refer the reader to Pointcheval’s survey
(Pointcheval, 2012).
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2 we describe the Real-or-Random model for
PAKE due to Abdalla et al. (Abdalla et al., 2005).
Next, in Section 3, we introduce simulation-based
model for PAKE from Boyko et al. (Boyko et al.,
2000). We assume some familiarity with the mod-
els and refer to the original publications for a full de-
scription. Section 4 examines the relation between the
Real-Or-Random model of (Abdalla et al., 2005) and
the simulation-based model of Boyko et al. (Boyko
et al., 2000). Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec-
tion 5.
2 The Real or Random Security
Model for PAKE
In this section, we recall the so-called Real-
or-Random (IND-RoR) security model for 2-party
PAKE, but before doing so, we introduce the notation
used throughout this paper.
2.1 Notation
We write d $←− D for sampling uniformly at random
from set D and |D| its cardinality. The output of a
probabilistic algorithm A on input x is denoted by
4In the plain model, the security of a cryptosystem is
proved using only general complexity assumptions and no
trusted setup.
y← A(x), while y := A(x,r) denotes the (determinis-
tic) output of an algorithm A on input x and fixed ran-
dom tape r. Adversaries (respectively, challengers)
will be denoted A (resp. CH ) in the IND-RoR model
and B (resp. RM ) in the SIM model. The direc-
tory of passwords is pw, PPT stands for probabilistic
polynomial-time and λ is the security parameter. A
function f : N→ R+ is said to be negligible if it de-
creases faster than the inverse of any polynomial and
the symbol negl designates some unspecified negligi-
ble function. We write A
c≡ B to denote two computa-
tionally indistinguishable distributions.
2.2 Description of the IND-RoR Model
The IND-RoR model of Abdalla et al. (Abdalla et al.,
2005) is built upon the Find-then-Guess (IND-FtG)
from (Bellare et al., 2000). As in IND-FtG, security
in the IND-RoR model is defined by a game played
between a challenger CH and adversary A whose
goal is to distinguish real session keys from random
strings. The main difference between the two models
is that the adversary – during the security experiment
– is allowed to ask multiple test queries in the IND-
RoR model, while in IND-FtG she is restricted to a
single test query.
Note that we will introduce only a minor change
to the IND-RoR and the SIM-BMP model in order
to allow meaningful comparison between them. Oth-
erwise, the models would be syntactically incompa-
rable. Whenever possible, we prefer to change the
SIM-BMP model rather than IND-RoR since the lat-
ter is more widespread.
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS. Each participant in a
two party PAKE protocol is either a client C ∈ C or a
server S∈ S . LetU=C ⋃S denote the set of all (hon-
est) participants. Additionally, each initialized par-
ticipant U is associated with a unique identifier idU .
During the execution of the protocol, there might be
several running instances of each participant. A run-
ning instance i of some participant U ∈U is called an
oracle instance and is denoted by ΠiU .
LONG-TERM SECRETS. Server S holds a password
pi for each client C. In the opposite direction, client C
holds a password pi for each server S. For simplicity
let pi also denote the function assigning passwords to
pair of users. We will refer to pi[idC, idS] as the pass-
word shared between client C and server S. Note that
pi[idC, idS] = pi[idS, idC], while pi[idS, idS] or pi[idC, idC]
are not allowed in the model. The passwords are as-
sumed to be independent and uniformly distributed.
PROTOCOL EXECUTION. Protocol P is an algo-
rithm that describes how participants behave in re-
sponse to inputs from their environment. Each par-
ticipant can run P in parallel with different partners,
which is modeled by allowing an unlimited number
of instances of each participant to be created. We
assume the presence of an adversary A who has full
control over the network i.e. she entirely controls the
communication between legitimate entities. She can
enumerate, off-line, the words of the password direc-
tory pw.
SECURITY EXPERIMENT IN IND-ROR MODEL.
Security in the IND-RoR model is defined via a game
played between the challenger CH and adversary A .
At the beginning of the experiment, CH tosses a coin
and sets b ∈ {0,1} outside of A’s view. Then A is
given access to i) endless supply of user instances ΠiU
and ii) oracle queries to control them. Oracle queries
are answered by the corresponding ΠiU according to
P. A’s goal is to find out the value of the hidden bit b.
Next, we summarize the oracle queries A can access
during the security experiment.
• initialize user(U, idU ,roleU ).A assigns the string
idU as identity and roleU ∈{client,server} to user
U ∈U, subject to the restriction that idU has not
been already assigned to another user. There are
two cases:
– In case roleU = client we shall simply write C
instead of U . Then, for every initialized server
S ∈ S with idS, a password is picked uniformly
at random from the dictionary and assigned
to the corresponding pair of client-server, i.e.
pi[idC, idS]
$←− pw.
– If roleU = server we simply write S instead of
U . Then, for every initialized client C ∈ C do
pi[idC, idS]
$←− pw.
• initialize user instance(U, i,roleiU , pidiU ). An in-
stance i ∈ N of initialized user U ∈ U is cre-
ated and denoted by ΠiU . It is assigned i) a role
roleiU ∈ {open,connect} and ii) a partner identity
pidiU corresponding to the identity of some user
U ′ that ΠiU is supposed to communicate with in
the future. The following constraint must hold:
– roleU and roleU ′ are complementary, i.e.
roleU = server and roleU ′ = client or the other
way around.
User instances are modeled as state machines with
implicit access to the protocol description P and
its corresponding password, i.e. some ΠiU with
pidiU = idU ′ is given access to pi[U, pidiU ].
• send (U, i,m). A sends message m to user in-
stance ΠiU . The latter behaves according to pro-
tocol description, sends back the response m′ to A
(if any) and updates its state as follows:
– continue: ΠiU is ready to receive another mes-
sage.
– reject: ΠiU aborts the protocol execution and
sets the session key skiU =⊥. This can be due
to receiving an unexpected message m.
– accept: ΠiU holds pidiU , session identifier sidiU
and skiU . However, ΠiU still expects to receive
another message to fulfill the protocol specifi-
cation.
– terminate: ΠiU holds pidiU , sidiU and skiU . It has
completed the protocol execution and will not
send nor receive any other message.
• execute (U, i,U ′, j). The transcript of the execu-
tion is returned to A . It models honest execution
of the protocol between ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ .
• test (U, i). A asks for the session key of user in-
stance ΠiU , CH responds as follows:
– If statusiU 6= terminate return ⊥.
– If statusiU = terminate, CH responds using the
bit b. If b = 1 then A gets the real sk of ΠiU ,
if b = 0 she gets a random string r $←− {0,1}lsk ,
where lsk denotes the length of session keys. To
ensure consistency, whenever b = 0 the same
random string is returned for test queries asked
to two partnered instances.
Matching Instances. Two user instances, ΠiU and
Π jU ′ , are matching instances if:
• pidiU = idU ′ , pid jU ′ = idU
• Users have complimentary roles, i.e. one has role
client and the other has role server.
• User instances have complimentary roles, i.e. one
instance has the role open and the other connect.
Partnering. Two matching instances ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ are
partners if both instances accept – each holding pidiU ,
sidiU , sk
i
U and pid
j
U ′ , sid
j
U ′ , sk
j
U ′ respectively – and the
following holds:
• sidiU = sid jU ′ and skiU = sk jU ′
• No oracle besides ΠiU and Π jU ′ accepts with some
sid′ = sidiU , except with negligible probability.
Advantage of the adversary. During the experiment,
A is allowed to ask several test queries directed to
different oracle instances ΠiU in the terminate state.
All these queries are answered depending on the bit b
chosen at the beginning of the experiment with either
the real session key if b = 1 or a random string other-
wise. At the end of the game, A outputs a bit b′ and
wins the game if b′ = b, i.e. if she distinguished real
session keys from random strings. The advantage of
A in the IND-RoR security game for protocol P and
passwords sampled uniformly at random from dictio-
nary pw is defined as follows:
AdvRoRP,pw(A) := 2 ·Pr(b′ = b)−1. (1)
Definition 1. Protocol P is secure in the IND-RoR
sense if for any PPT adversary A:
AdvRoRP,pw(A)≤
k ·n
|pw| +negl(λ) , (2)
where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions
initialized byA , k∈N and λ is the security parameter.
Remark 1. When using passwords as means of au-
thentication, there is a non-negligible probability of
an adversary successfully impersonating an honest
user by simply guessing its password. This problem is
unavoidable and inherent to PAKE protocols. Conse-
quently the security definition considers a PAKE pro-
tocol to be secure if only on-line dictionary attacks are
possible i.e. the protocol should not leak any informa-
tion that allows the adversary to obtain the password
in an off-line manner. In the remaining of the paper,
we consider the best scenario where k = 1 i.e. the
adversary can test at most one password per active
instance.
3 Security in Simulation Model
SIM-based security requires the definition of two
scenarios: i) an Ideal World (IW ) which describes the
key exchange service that is meant to be provided and
ii) a Real World (RW ) to describe the real interaction
between honest protocol participants and an adver-
sary attacking the protocol. The IW is designed in
such a way that it is secure by definition and follows
the desired security properties that a PAKE should
satisfy.
As mentioned in (Boyko et al., 2000) and (Canetti
et al., 2005), there are two ways to incorporate online
dictionary attacks in SIM-based security models:
1. Incorporate the non-negligible probability of an
adversary guessing the password into the ideal
world, by explicitly allowing the ideal world ad-
versary to verify the guess of a candidate pass-
word. Then one defines a protocol to be secure if
the real-world execution is computationally indis-
tinguishable from an execution in the ideal world.
2. Do not allow password guessing in the ideal world
but relax the requirement of indistinguishability
between the real world and ideal world transcripts.
One defines a protocol to be secure as one whose
real-world execution is distinguishable from an
execution in the ideal world with probability at
most n/|pw|+ negl(λ), where n is the number
of active user instances and pw is the dictionary.
Keep in mind that we make use of this approach
in Section 4 when we prove Theorem 3.
The first approach is considered in (Boyko et al.,
2000), (Canetti et al., 2005) and the second is consid-
ered in (Goldreich and Lindell, 2001), (Nguyen and
Vadhan, 2008).
Next, we describe the simulation model of Boyko
et al. (Boyko et al., 2000), which we simply call
the SIM-BMP model. Their work is an extension of
(Shoup, 1999) to the password setting.
3.1 Ideal World
The ideal world (IW ) model describes the service that
a PAKE aims to provide, i.e. to allow parties to jointly
compute a high entropy secret session key, which can
be used later in higher level applications. In the IW
there are no messages flowing around the network nor
cryptography. The session keys are chosen at ran-
dom by a trusted party and delivered out-of-band to
the honest users.
Formally, the ideal world involves interaction be-
tween a trusted entity called ideal world Ring Mas-
ter and an ideal world adversary, denoted by RM ∗
and B∗ respectively. The ring master is similar to the
challenger in the IND-RoR experiment. The details
of the ideal world execution follow.
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS: As defined in the
IND-RoR model.
LONG-TERM SECRETS: The SIM-BMP model
does not make any assumption on the password dis-
tribution. However, to allow a fair comparison to the
IND-RoR model, we assume the passwords to be in-
dependent and uniformly distributed.
PROTOCOL EXECUTION: There is no protocol ex-
ecution in the ideal world. The session key of an in-
stance is generated by the RM ∗ when B∗ asks that
instance the start session query. Additionally B∗ is
given access to the following oracles:
• initialize user(U, idU ,roleU ). Identical to that in
the IND-RoR model.
[Transcript:(“init. user”,U,roleU )]
• initialize user instance(U, i,roleiU , pidiU ). Identi-
cal to that in the IND-RoR model.
[Transcript: (“init. inst.”,U, i,roleiU , pid
i
U )]
• abort user instance (U, i) Adversary B∗ asks
RM ∗ to abort user instance ΠiU . We say then that
ΠiU is aborted.
[Transcript: (“abort. user inst.”,U, i)]
• test instance password (U, i,pi′). For user in-
stance ΠiU and password guess pi′, B∗ queries if
pi′ equals pi(U, pidiU ). If this is true, the query is
called successful guess on {U, pidiU}.
This query can be asked only once per user in-
stance. The user instance must be initialized and
not yet engaged in a session, i.e. no start session
operation has been performed for that instance.
Note that B∗ is allowed to ask a test instance pass-
word query to an instance that is aborted. This
query does not leave any records in the transcript.
• start session(U, i). B∗ specifies that a session
key for user instance ΠiU must be generated, by
specifying one of the three connection assigments
available:
– open for connection from (U ′, j). This opera-
tion is allowed if: c1) roleiU = open and user in-
stancesΠiU andΠ
j
U ′ are matching instances, c2)
Π jU ′ has been initialized and not aborted, c3) no
other instance is open for connection from Π jU ′
and c4) no test instance password operation has
been performed on ΠiU . Then RM
∗ generates
session key skiU at random. Then ΠiU is said to
be open for connection from Π jU ′ .
– connect to (U ′, j). This operation is allowed if:
c1) roleiU = connect and user instances ΠiU and
Π jU ′ are matching instances, c2) Π
j
U ′ has been
initialized and not aborted, c3) Π jU ′ was open
for connection from ΠiU after ΠiU was initial-
ized andΠ jU ′ is still open for connection and c4)
no test instance password operation has been
performed on ΠiU . The RM
∗ sets skiU = sk
j
U ′
and Π jU ′ is no longer open for connection.
– expose (U, i,sk). B∗ assigns session key sk to
user instanceΠiU . It requires that there has been
a successful test instance password on ΠiU .
[Transcript: (“start session”,U, i)]
• application ( f ,U, i). The adversary specifies an
efficiently computable function f and a user in-
stance ΠiU for which a session key skiU has al-
ready been established. It gets back f ({skiU},R),
where R is a global random bit string which user
instances are given access to. R is not correlated
to the established session keys and usually is re-
ferred to as the environment.
[Transcript: (“application”, f , f (skiU ,R))]
• implementation. This is a do nothing operation.
B∗ is allowed to place implementation operations
without taking any effect in the ideal world. It is
needed to allow B∗ to construct transcripts that
are equivalent to those in the real world.
[Transcript: (“impl”,cmmt)]
Transcript. Some of the previously mentioned
queries are recorded in a transcript. Let IWT ∗ denote
the transcript generated by B∗.
Remark 2. The SIM-BMP model handles on-line dic-
tionary attacks by introducing the notion of passwords
and specifically the test instance password query in
the IW. This approach allows having ideal world ex-
ecutions which are computationally indistinguishable
from real world ones.
The purpose of running a key exchange protocol is
to later use the established session keys in higher-level
application protocols, e.g. encryption for secure com-
munication. However, the use of such session keys
may leak information about the key to the adversary.
The application query models the ability of the ad-
versary to get any information she wishes about the
environment and the established session keys. The
function f is defined by B∗, the only constraint is that
it must be efficiently computable.
3.2 Real World
The real-world (RW ) describes the scenario where a
PAKE protocol runs. There is a real world Ring Mas-
ter (RM ), whose role is similar to the role of the chal-
lenger in the IND-RoR experiment, and a real-world
adversary B who tries to attack the PAKE.
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS: Identical to IW .
LONG-TERM SECRETS: Identical to IW .
PROTOCOL EXECUTION: The same as in the IND-
RoR model. Also, user instances are defined as state
machines with implicit access to idU , pidiu and the
corresponding password. The communication be-
tween the instances is entirely controlled by B via the
following queries:
• initialize user(U, idU ,roleU ). Identical to that in
the IND-RoR model.
[Transcript:(“init. user”,U,roleU )]
• initialize user instance(U, i,roleiU , pidiU ). Identi-
cal to that in the IND-RoR model.
[Transcript: (“init. inst.”,U, i,roleiU , pid
i
U )]
• send (U, i,m). The same as in the IND-RoR
model except that the following is added to the
transcript:
[Transcript: (“impl”, “msg”,U, i,m,m′,stateiU )].
Additionally, the following record is added to the
transcript depending on stateiU .
If stateiU = “terminate” add (“start session”,U, i).
If stateiU = “abort” add (“abort”,U, i).
• application ( f ,U, i). The same as in IW .
[Transcript: (“application”, f , f (skiU ,R))]
Transcript. Let RWT be the transcript generated by
B . This is a sequence of records describing the ac-
tions of B when interacting with the real world proto-
col. RM generates B’s random tape and places it in
the first record of the transcript.
[Transcript: (“impl”,“random tape”,rt).
Definition 2. (Simulatability). A protocol is SIM-
BMP secure if for every efficient real-world adversary
B , there exists an efficient ideal world adversary B∗,
such that RWT
c≡ IWT ∗. Alternatively:
∀B ∃B∗ ∀D : |Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−
Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]| ≤ negl(λ) (3)
4 Relations between IND-RoR and
SIM-BMP
In this section, we establish the relations between
IND-RoR and SIM-BMP security models for PAKE.
We start by showing that SIM-BMP security implies
IND-RoR security.
Table 1: Correspondence of A’s and B’s queries.
IND-RoR SIM-BMP
init user init user
init user instance init user instance
send send
execute send
test application
Theorem 1. (SIM-BMP Security ⇒ IND-RoR Secu-
rity). If protocol P is secure in the SIM-BMP model,
then P is also secure in the IND-RoR model.
Proof. We show that if protocol P satisfies SIM-BMP
security, then the advantage of any adversary A in
the IND-RoR experiment is bounded by n/|pw|+
negl(λ), where n is an upper bound on the number
of instances created by A .
For simplicity the proof is divided in two parts:
i) Building a real-world adversary B from A and ii)
Building a distinguisher D . Details follow:
i) First we construct B using an A as a subroutine,
where B uses his own RM to answer A’s queries.
B , using his own queries, can perfectly simulate the
IND-RoR experiment to A (see Table 1). The interac-
tion RM vs B produces a transcript RWT . Next we
describe the procedure in detail:
• The interaction RM vs B starts when the for-
mer initializes B with random tape rtB - as de-
scribed in Section 3. Next B , who simulates the
challenger CH in the IND-RoR game, generates a
uniformly distributed bit-string rtA and initializes
A with random tape rtA .
• B sets b $←− {0,1} outside A’s view.
• B interacts with his RM as follows: When A
makes initialize user, initialize user instance or
send queries, B simply forwards them to his RM
and its response (if any) is forwarded back to A .
When A makes execute queries, they are con-
verted into send queries appropriately.
• B answers A’s test query using his application
query and bit b. If b = 1 then B uses his applica-
tion query to reveal skiU , however, if b= 0, then B
generates a random string r← {0,1}lsk and gives
it to A . As in the IND-RoR experiment, in order
to avoid strategies where A could trivially win the
game, whenever b = 0 the same r is returned for
test queries asked to two partnered instances 5.
• The game continues and A is allowed to make
more queries as she wishes. Eventually, A out-
puts her guess b′ and the IND-RoR game finishes.
• B makes an application query and writes in the
transcript the string “b,rtA”.
• The transcript created is RWT . We recall
that SIM-BMP security definition guarantees that
∀B ∃B∗ such that RWT c≡ IWT ∗.
ii) Build a PPT distinguisherD whose aim is to distin-
guish real-word from ideal-world transcripts. D gets
as input a transcript t ∈ {RWT, IWT ∗}, which D uses
to initialize a PPT adversary A and simulate an IND-
RoR experiment to A . We show that, if SIM-security
holds, A can not win his IND-RoR experiment with
advantage greater than n/|pw|+ negl(λ). On input
some transcript t, D proceeds as follows:
• Look for the last record of the transcript contain-
ing the string “b,rtA”.
• D “simulates” the challenger in the IND-RoR ex-
periment. He initializes A on random tape rtA .
Since A is given rtA , she behaves (deterministic)
the same way as recorded in the transcript t. Ev-
ery query asked by A can be answered by D by
just reading t.
• Eventually A outputs her guess b′ andD proceeds
as follows: If b = b′ D outputs “1” and if b 6=
b′ it outputs “0”. Additionally, when a bad event
5In order to achieve sound simulation, we assume that
partnering information is publicly computable (Brzuska
et al., 2011).
occurs, e.g. A can not be initialized, or her queries
can not be answered by reading t, then D outputs
⊥.
A wins her IND-RoR game whenever she outputs
b′ = b. By construction of D it holds that:
Pr [1←D(RWT ) ] = Pr [A wins | t = RWT ]
and
Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ] = Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]
From Equation 3 of SIM-BMP security we know the
following holds:
|Pr [A wins | t = RWT ]−
Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]| ≤ negl(λ) (4)
The term Pr [A wins | t = RWT ] is actually the
probability of A winning on a perfectly simu-
lated IND-RoR experiment. In order to prove
SIM-BMP ⇒ IND-RoR we have to show that
Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]≤ n/(2∗ |pw|)+1/2.
We proceed to analyze the term
Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]. Let γ be the event that
a successful test instance password query occurs
during the execution of B∗ interacting with RM ∗.
Let β be the complement of γ.
Claim 1: Pr(b = b′ | β) = 1/2.
Proof. Given that β occurred, the sk’s placed in IWT ∗
were generated according to the open and connect as-
signments of the start session query. Therefore, the
part of the IWT ∗ used to answer A’s queries is in-
dependent of the hidden bit b so Pr(b = b′ | β) =
1/2. 
Claim 2: Pr(γ)≤ n/|pw|.
Proof. For a single user instance, the probability of a
successful password guess by B∗ is 1/|pw|. We apply
the union bound, and get that if there are at most n
instances, Pr(γ)≤ n/|pw|. 
Using Claim 1 and Claim 2 we get:
Pr [A wins | IWT ∗ ] = Pr [β ] ·Pr[(b′ = b) | β]
+Pr [γ ] ·Pr[(b′ = b) | γ]
≤ 1
2
+
n
2 · |pw| (5)
We combine with Equation 4 and obtain:
Pr [A wins | RWT ]≤ 1
2
+
n
2 · |pw| +negl(λ)
We get that, if SIM-BMP-security holds, then ∀
PPT A AdvRoRP,pw(A) ≤ n/|pw|+negl(λ), proving that
SIM-BMP⇒ IND-RoR.
Now we investigate the reverse, i.e. whether IND-
RoR security implies SIM-BMP security. We obtain
the following result:
Theorem 2. If P is not SIM-BPM secure, then ∃A s.t.
AdvRoRP,pw(A ,n) > nA/|pw|+ω, where nA is the num-
ber of explicit password guesses of A and ω is a non-
negligible function of the security parameter.
Proof. We build A as the sequential composition of
two adversaries: A1 and A2. First, A invokes A1. A1
tries a number of online dictionary attacks. If one of
these is successful, then A can win the IND-RoR ex-
periment. If none of the online dictionary attacks is
successful, then A invokes A2. Next, we describe the
details of A1 and A2.
i) Build A1. Let A1 be an adversary who tries to im-
personate user U to user V nA times. Each time, A1
chooses a new candidate password and runs the proto-
col with V . If one of the password guesses is success-
ful, then A1 can win the IND-RoR experiment. By
construction,
Pr [A1 wins ] =
nA
|pw| (6)
ii) Build A2. We have assumed that SIM security does
not hold. Then ∃B ∀B∗ ∃D s.t.:
|Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]|>ω ,
(7)
where ω is non-negligible term.
Let A2 be an adversary in the IND-RoR experi-
ment which uses B and D as subroutine. The game
A2 vs CH proceeds as follows:
• At the beginning of the experiment, CH chooses
a bit b at random and outside A2’s view.
• A2 uses B as subroutine and answers B’s queries
as follows: WhenB asks for initialize user, initial-
ize user instance or send queries, A2 simply for-
wards them to her CH and its response (if any) is
forwarded back to B .
• A2 uses her test query to answer B’s application
queries. When B asks for an application of the
efficiently computable function f on skiU and a
global random string R, A2 asks Test(U, i) to her
CH , obtains skiU , computes f (skiU ,R) and sends
the result to B .
• The game continues until B decides to stop. Let
nB be the number of instances initialized by B .
B’s actions produce a transcript t. Based on
whether b= 1 or b= 0 this is either a real-world or
ideal world transcript. Indeed, depending on the
bit b, Test(U, i) either returns the real session keys
or a random string. Therefore, when b= 1,A2 can
perfectly simulate the RM to B and the transcript
produced is RWT . However, when b = 0, appli-
cation queries are computed with random strings,
in which case the transcript produced is IWT ∗.
• Next, A2 invokes D(t) and simply forwards D’s
output to CH .
By construction, A2 wins whenever D is able to
distinguish real-world from ideal-world transcripts.
Therefore:
Pr [A2 wins ] = Pr [b = 1 ] ·Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]
+Pr [b = 0 ] ·Pr [0←D(IWT ∗) ] ,
which using Equation 7 gives:
Pr [A2 wins ]>
1
2
+ω (8)
We build A as the sequential composition of A1
and A2. It follows that:
Pr [A wins ] = Pr [A1 wins ]+Pr [A2 wins ]
−Pr [A1 wins ] ·Pr [A2 wins ],
which from Equations 6 and 8 yields:
Pr [A wins ]>
nA
2 · pw +
1
2
+ω
AdvRoRP,pw(A)>
nA
pw
+ω , (9)
where ω is a non-negligible function.
Unfortunately, Theorem 2 is not enough to prove
that IND-RoR ⇒ SIM-BMP. The reason is that the
total number of instances initialized by A is nA +nB.
Therefore, proving by contradiction that IND-RoR
⇒ SIM-BMP would require AdvRoRP,pw(A) > (nA +
nB)/pw+ω.
We recall from Section 3 that there are two ways
to take account of online dictionary attacks in SIM-
based security models for PAKEs:
1. Include a test instance password query in IW
and require computational indistinguishability of
RWT and IWT ∗.
2. Do not include a test instance password in IW but
allow a non-negligible bound on the distinguisha-
bility of RWT and IWT ∗.
The original SIM-BMP model follows the first
style. Now we modify it to follow the second style.
We call the modified model SIM-BMP’. The only
changes are the following:
1. Remove the test instance password query from
IW in SIM-BMP.
2. Relax the requirement of indistinguishability be-
tween real and ideal world.
SIM-BMP’ security. Protocol P is SIM-BMP’ secure
if for all adversaries B , there exits an Ideal World ad-
versary B∗ such that for all distinguishers D:
|Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]|
≤ n|pw| +negl(λ) (10)
Next, we show that IND-RoR security implies
SIM-BMP’ security.
Theorem 3. (IND-RoR Security⇒ SIM-BMP’ Secu-
rity). If protocol P is secure in the IND-RoR model,
then P is also secure in the SIM-BMP’ model.
Proof. This is a proof by contradiction and the strat-
egy is similar to the one employed in Theorem 2.
We assume that SIM-BMP’ security does not
hold. Then ∃B ∀B∗ ∃D s.t.:
|Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]|
>
n
|pw| +ω , (11)
where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions
initialized and ω is non-negligible function.
Then, we build an adversary A using B and D
as subroutines such that A breaks IND-RoR security.
We construct A from B and D in exactly the same
way as we built A2 from B and D in the proof of
Theorem 2.
Using the same analysis as in the proof of Theo-
rem 2, we get:
Pr [A wins ] = Pr [b = 1 ] ·Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]
+Pr [b = 0 ] ·Pr [0←D(IWT ∗) ] ,
which using Equation 11 gives:
Pr [A wins ] =
1
2
+
n
2 · |pw| +ω ,
And finally from Equation 1:
AdvRoRP,pw(A)>
n
|pw| +ω
but ω is not negligible, a contradiction.
We investigate the reverse, i.e. whether SIM-
BMP’ security implies IND-RoR security. We obtain
the following results:
Theorem 4. (SIM-BMP’ Security⇒ IND-RoR Secu-
rity). If protocol P is SIM-BMP’ secure, then for all
PPT A , AdvRoRP,pw(A)≤ 2 ·n/|pw|+negl(λ).
Proof. We follow the same argument as in the proof
of Theorem 1 up to Equation 4, which we simply up-
date according to the SIM-BMP’ security definition
given in Equation 10. Hence:
|Pr [A wins | t = RWT ]−Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]|
≤ n|pw| +negl(λ) (12)
It is easy to see that Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ] =
1/2 since A cannot gain any information about the
hidden bit b. However, Pr [A wins | t = RWT ] =
1/2+ 1/2 · AdvRoRP,pw(A) as result of A running on a
perfectly simulated IND-RoR experiment. Following
Equation 12 we obtain:
AdvRoRP,pw(A)≤
2 ·n
|pw| +negl(λ)
The guarantee ∀A , AdvRoRP,pw(A) ≤ 2·n|pw| + negl(λ)
means that protocol P satisfies the definition of IND-
RoR security (Definition 1) with parameter k = 2. A
similar factor of 2 appears in the reduction used in
(Abdalla et al., 2005) to prove that IND-RoR security
implies IND-FtG security.
Using the results of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3,
as well as the known relation IND-RoR ⇒ IND-
FtG (Abdalla et al., 2005), we obtain the following
corollary:
Corollary 1. The following relations hold
• SIM-BMP Security⇒ IND-FtG Security
• SIM-BMP Security⇒ SIM-BMP’ Security
The question of whether SIM-BMP’ Security ⇒
SIM-BMP Security remains open. Note SIM-BMP’
⇒ SIM-BMP would imply that the three security no-
tions IND-RoR, SIM-BPM and SIM-BMP’ are equiv-
alent.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Although PAKE is a widely studied primitive and
found in real-world security protocols, a clear relation
between its major security notions (IND and SIM)
was missing in the literature. In this work, we aimed
at filling this gap. We have summarized the relations
obtained in this paper in Figure 2.
During our work on this topic, we identified some
delicate definitional issues veiled under the many sub-
tleties of the security notions for PAKE. Among them,
we mention that in previous works the advantage of
an IND-RoR attacker is formulated according to pa-
rameter n, which represents the number of instances
created by such adversary. As nothing else is said
about n, we interpret it as the worst-case number of
instances created by the adversary. Note that such
naive definition does not specify or take into account
the fact that the adversary’s strategy is randomized,
and thus n may be a randomized function as well. For
instance, an adversary could create a large number
of instances with negligible probability making the
bound on its advantage grow. Another related issue is
about the password correlation between the instances.
We leave the quest for a more precise definition that
would take into account the above-mentioned remarks
for future work.
SIM–BMP′
IND–RoR SIM–BMP
IND–FtG SIM–UC
Figure 2: Relation between PAKE security definitions. In
dashed arrows are the new results of this paper.
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